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BITS AND BYTES: THE CARNIVORE INITIATIVE AND THE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF ELECTRONIC MAIL
This Note examines the application of Fourth Amendment search and seizure
doctrines to the interception of electronic mail within the context of the FBI
Carnivore initiative. The author argues that the traditional law of electronic
surveillance's understanding ofcommunication is outdated and never contemplated
new technologies like Carnivore and theirfarreaching implications. Consequently,
the author argues, that to protect our long-understood expectations ofprivacy, the
search and seizure of electronic documents should be analyzed under the
traditional papers analysis. To do so, the Supreme Court would afford the
interception electronic documents the highest form of constitutional protect
available under law.
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day
be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.'
I. INTRODUCrION
Evolving communications technologies pose a challenge to civil libertarians and
law enforcement. In particular, the privacy of electronic mail presents the unique
challenge of requiring a new legal paradigm by which to analyze public policies
seeking to balance the interests between individual rights and crime fighting. This
Note examines the application of Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrines
to electronic mail within the context of the FBI Carnivore initiative. Two modes
of legal analysis present themselves as possible standards for interception of e-mail:
(1) those established for interception of traditional mail; or (2) those established for
electronic surveillance. E-mail constitutes a hybrid means of communication
combining the form of traditional papers with the manner of telephone
conversations. Because of its unique nature, e-mail does not fit neatly within either
paradigm. Currently, however, courts approach computer-based communications
from the position of traditional electronic surveillance, subjecting it to those
protections. This Note argues that search and seizure of electronic documents is
better analyzed under a traditional papers analysis, affording it the highest fornof
constitutional protection. In addition, this Note applies both standards to the
Carnivore initiative and analyzes the constitutionality of law enforcement
interception of electronic mail addresses.
' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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1. BACKGROUND: THE CARNIVORE INITIATIVE
The FBI electronic surveillance program known as Carnivore first came to light
during an April 6, 2000 congressional Constitution subcommittee hearing.' There
the Bureau revealed that it had utilized a new interception device approximately
twenty-five times in the last two years.
The project originated from a still-classified surveillance system deemed
technologically deficient In February 1997, it evolved into an FBI project known
as Omnivore.' The Omnivore system originally ran on a Solaris X86 computer and
was replaced by the Windows NT-based computer in June 1999, which became
known as Carnivore.6
According to the FBI, Carnivore is a special-purpose electronic surveillance
system that allows for full communication content interceptions and pen register,
as well as trap and trace investigations, to acquire addressing information.' It is part
of a group of software applications known as the "DragonWare suite" that allows
law enforcement to capture, store, and process packets of electronic information.8
According to the FBI, the process works as follows:
Carnivore's filtering operates in stages. Carnivore's first action is to
filter a portion of an ISP's highspeed [sic] network traffic. Specifically,
it filters binary code - streams of 0's and l's that flow through an ISP
2 ACLU Urges Congress to Put a Leash on "Carnivore" and Other Government
Snoopware Programs, ACLU Press Release (July 12, 2000), at http://www.aclu.org/
news/2000/n071200b.html.
3 Carnivore Diagnostic Tool. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Courts of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (Sept. 6,2000) (statement of Donald M. Kerr,
Assistant Director Laboratory Division FBI) [hereinafter Kerr].
" Kevin Poulsen, Carnivore Details Emerge, SECURITY FOCUS NEWS (Oct. 4,2000), at
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/97 [hereinafter Poulsen].
Id.
6 Press Release, Electronic Privacy Information Center, FBI Releases Carnivore
Documents to EPIC (Oct. 2, 2000), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/foia-pr.html.
7 Kerr, supra note 3, at 6.
8 Poulsen, supra note 4. DragonWare is not the only available sniffer software. Several
public software products enable interception of computer information packets. One of these,
EtherPeek, enables a user to survey web usage as well as e-mail traffic. In a demonstration
by the Illinois Institute of Technolog&y Research Institute and Chicago-Kent College of Law,
researchers found "the full content of the e-mail thus retrieved and the full content of the
URLs and selected pages were clearly visible in the plain text ASCI window of the
software." Thomas Gregory Motta, Government and Electronic Privacy: Trends in Law
Enforcement, Investigatory Tools and Protection of National Security, in SECOND ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH-TECH AND
CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 705 (Francoise Gilbert et al. eds. 2001) [hereinafter
Motta].
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network .... If the subject's identifying information is detected, the
packets of the subject's communication associated with the identifying
information that was detected, and those alone, are segregated for
additional filtering or storage .... After exclusively segregating the
subject's information for further machine processing, then a second
stage of filtering is employed ... Carnivore checks its programming to
see what it should filter and collect for processing.9
The system operates at the ISP level and sniffs through literally millions of bits
per second searching for the specific code associated with a criminal subject.' ° It
can be configured to gather only pen register, trap and trace transactional and
addressing information, or comprehensively collect the entire message."
Under a pen register or trap and trace order, law enforcement is authorized to
collect source, destination, date, time, duration, and user account address
information. 2 Pen registers have been utilized for telephone surveillance and are
recognized as constitutional by the Supreme Court. 3 Traditionally, a pen register
records "telephone numbers that are dialed from a phone, and trap and trace devices
are used to determine the number of origin of a telephone call."' 4
Privacy advocates argue that traditional pen registers and trap and trace are
much less intrusive than use of this new technique in cyberspace. 5 Online, the
contents of the messages and the sender information cannot be separated.' 6 With
traditional telephone messages, information concerning the number called is sent
prior to any message being created, but the conversation has not yet taken place.
In contrast, an e-mail message contains the content of the message alongside the
address to or from which it is being sent.
In addition, labeling information could include subject lines. A great deal of
9 Kerr, supra note 3, at 9.
10 Id.
I Idat9-10.
12 Id at 10.
13 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1975).
14 The Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Testimony Before the Subcomm. On the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106 Cong. (2000) (Apr. 6, 2000)
(statement of Robert Corn-Revere, Partner, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.), at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/com0406.htm.
1' Privacy advocates active in electronic liberties include the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), Electronic Freedom Foundation (EFF), Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC), and Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT). See Motta, supra note
8, at 653. For a website critical of the initiative, see http://www.stopcarnivore.com.
16 The Fourth Amendment and Carnivore: Statement of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. On the Judiciary,
106"' Cong. (July 28, 2000), at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance?Camivore/
20000728_effhousecamivore.html.
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specific information may be intercepted and reviewed if the packet contains a
subject line. The FBI contends that it limits such searches to transactional records
as defined under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986." Such
records include "addressing, routing, billing, or other information maintained or
generated by the service provider... [but] do not include the content."' 8 Whether
or not the system gathers actual content is highly debated, and the answer may only
come with the further release of technical documentation by the FBI.
In addition, Carnivore may be used to obtain full communications of a
particular criminal subject under an authorized Title Ill intercept. 9 Configured for
a full content collection, the software obtains information far beyond electronic
mail.20 Independent analysis conducted by the Illinois Institute of Technology in
conjunction with the Chicago-Kent School of Law verified that Carnivore can
"collect the contents of a target's e-mail."' In addition, the software possesses a
full collection mode that allows interception of all communications from a fixed IP
address.2 Under this mode the system collects "web browsing contents, FTP login
session, commands and data, and e-mail contents." 3
Proponents contend that the Carnivore initiative is an important tool in
combating criminals of all ilks. "Now that most transactions and exchanges have
become electronic, you really don't need to be an expert to predict that this will
become, or already is, a crime generator."24 The FBI argues that terrorists, spies,
hackers, and other criminals are increasingly utilizing computer networks and
electronic communications to develop and execute their plans.25 As in prior
privacy-versus-law enforcement debates, the Bureau points to several high profile
cases to illustrate its point.26 For example, terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and
'7 Kerr, supra note 3, at 4-5.
SId at 4.
'9 Id. at 13.
20 See Motta, supra note 8, at 684-85.
21 Id. at 685.
22 Id.
23 id.
24 Thomas J. Talleur, The Eavesdropping Society: Electronic Surveillance and
Information Brokering, in SECONDANNUALINSTrIUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: STRATEGIES FOR
LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH-TECH AND CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 573
(Francoise Gilbert et al. eds., 2001) (quoting Lolk Weerd, Police Inspector and Computer
Crime-Unit Expert, Haaglanden Regional Police, The Netherlands).
See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1-3.
26 Many of the same arguments and concerns have been expressed by law enforcement
and privacy advocates in debates over digital telephony and encryption. For a complete
discussion on these two issues, see WHITFIELD DIFFIE AND SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE
LINE: THE POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION (1998); THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
PAPERS: DOCUMENTS ON THE BATTLE FOR PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (Bruce
Schneier & David Banisar eds., 1997) [hereinafter THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS].
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Ramnzi Yousef are utilizing computers to mastermind major attacks against the
United States, and West German hackers have gained access to Department of
Defense systems with the financial backing of the KGB.27 Finally, the Bureau
points to statistics illustrating the increasing use of the Internet for both financial
fraud and child pornography. 8
Because of these new threats, it is argued, law enforcement must respond with
ever-increasing forms of surveillance.29 Communications interception plays an
essential part in solving and preventing many crimes. From 1985 to 1991, court-
ordered electronic surveillance conducted by the FBI led to 7,324 convictions,
almost $300 million in fines being levied, over $750 million in recoveries,
restitution and court ordered forfeitures, and close to $2 billion in prevented
potential economic loss." The Carnivore initiative is only one in a series of
attempts by law enforcement and Congress to combat this new form of crime.3
These new surveillance systems have been subject to the traditional legal
standard created for wiretapping. Currently, all forms of electronic surveillance are
subject to control under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which
amended Title M of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title
E[[.32
Officers must obtain either a full Title I court order requiring probable cause
for intercepting communications' content or an ECPA order based upon relevancy
for communications' addressing and transactional record information.33 To obtain
a full content order, the application must particularly and specifically state the
offense, the facility through which the communications are to be intercepted, a
description of the types of conversations to be intercepted, and the identities of the
persons committing the offenses and anticipated to be intercepted.34
In addition, applications under Title II require the authorization of a high-level
Department of Justice official and are subject to approval and review by federal
district court judges." Furthermore, applicants must indicate that other normal
investigative techniques have failed, will not work, or are too dangerous. 6
7 See generally STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION
(1984).
28 See Kerr, supra note 3, at 3-4.
29 Id at 16.
30 Testimony Before the Subcomm. On Technology, Environment and Aviation of the
House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 103dCONG. (1994) (statement of Dorothy
Denning, Professor of Computer Science, Georgetown University).
31 See generally THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 26.
32 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2001).
33 Id.
34Id.
3s Kerr, supra note 3, at 13.
36 Id.
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Surveillance orders are also limited in duration and require periodic reporting to the
courts.37
It is unclear whether these traditional statutory concepts translate to the online
environment. Unlike telephone taps, where the target's lines are accessed directly,
electronic surveillance requires that a suspect's communications be picked out of
millions of other documents being sent through cyberspace. This necessarily means
searching through the private communications of non-suspects. As a matter of
legal interpretation and practical application, existing statutes do not clearly apply
to Internet communications.38
In the online world, pen registers and trap and traces convey much more
information than that of traditional phone communications. Furthermore,
documents in electronic form may be better protected under traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence than under the law of electronic surveillance.
M. LAW OF TRADITIONAL MAIL
The Fourth Amendment explicitly recognizes an individual privacy interest in
personal papers.39 The Framers meant to protect it when drafting the Bill of Rights,
and the courts have long held that a man's correspondence is held to the highest
level of protection, as if it were an extension of the home.40 The Fourth
Amendment provides the most expansive protection against searches and seizures
and most clearly delineates a right to be "left alone." Specifically, the amendment
protects:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.4
Unlike the privacy of persons and relationships that are found in numerous
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, privacy of place and papers is fairly well
outlined within the actual text of the Fourth Amendment.42 However, even it has
had to evolve over time to clarify what places are protected from intrusion and what
37 id.
See Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/com0406.htm.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
40 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,457 (1928).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing privacy rights found within
constitutional penumbras); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (same).
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the consequences are for the state when it violates individuals' rights.
The Court first recognized a right to privacy inherent within the Fourth
Amendment in Boyd v. United States.43 The case involved a seizure and forfeiture
of thirty-five cases of plate glass thought to be in violation of customs laws." The
government ordered Boyd to produce invoices for the cases of glass.4" The
defendant argued that in a suit for forfeiture, no evidence can be compelled from the
claimants themselves, and to compel production of evidence to be used against them
is unconstitutional.'
The Supreme Court agreed. Looking to English common law, Justice Bradley
quoted Lord Camden as saying:
[E]very invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass
.. papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest
property .... It is not the breaking of his doors, and rummaging of his
drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property.47
In Boyd, the Court held that Fourth Amendment rights must be construed
broadly to protect the essence of the search and seizure language.' "Constitutional
provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A
close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual deprecation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
substance."' 9 Thus the Court laid the foundation for an expanding protection of
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The amendment itself only makes mention of persons, houses, papers, and
effects, but the Court never restricted constitutionally permissible claims of privacy
against official intrusions to a literal reading of the Fourth Amendment."0 While the
Court eventually placed some limitations on privacy expectations in open spaces,
it found a propertied basis for privacy protection in homes, offices, hotel rooms,
apartments, automobiles, and taxicabs.5' The most obvious of these is the home -
41 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
4 Idat 618.
45 Id.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 627-28, 630.
48 id.
41 Id. at 635.
so DAVID O'BREN, PRIVACY, LAW AND PUBUC Poucy (1979).
s' Id. See e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (extending protection to hotel
rooms); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (extending protection to taxicabs); Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (extending protection to autos); United States v. Jeffers,
2002]
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after all, "a man's home is his castle."
In particular, two cases exemplify the Court's protection of homes. Weeks v.
United States involved a defendant who was charged with using the mail for the
purpose of transporting items related to a lottery.52 Weeks was arrested by a police
officer at his office without a warrant.5" Other officers went to his house, where
they located a key and entered.'" A search of his room revealed numerous papers
and other articles that officers turned over to a U.S. Marshal." Later the same day,
several other policemen returned with the same marshal and gained entry to the
home by permission of a renter living there.5' A second search revealed more
documents.57 Neither search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant and
Weeks was subsequently convicted and sent to prison."8 The Court held that the
taking of documents without a warrant violated the constitutional rights of the
defendant.5 9
The Court's holding supported the Boyd decision finding that an individual's
home and papers enjoy the utmost protection under the Fourth Amendment. 60
Justice Day wrote that the amendment:
[T]ook its origin in the determination of the framers of the Amendments
to the Federal Constitution to provide for that instrument a Bill of
Rights, securing to the American people, among other things, those
safeguards which had grown up in England to protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted under the
general warrants issued under authority of the Government by which
there had been invasions of the home and privacy of the citizens and the
seizure of their private papers in support of charges, real or imaginary,
made against them."
Weeks created the exclusionary rule prohibiting admission in federal courts of
illegally seized evidence.' 2 Day argued that to allow the introduction of illegally
342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (extending protection to offices).
52 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
53 Id.
4 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 390.
62 Id.
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seized materials would be to "affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not
an open defiance, of the constitution. 63 The Fourth Amendment safeguards
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, and therefore requires the
exclusion at trial of any evidence unlawfully obtained.'
The exclusionary rule, however, did not immediately apply to the states. In
fact, the Supreme Court directly rejected its application to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment in Wolfv. Colorado.6 Not until the 1961 case of Mapp v.
Ohio did the exclusionary rule apply to evidence offered in a criminal trial in a state
court.66
A right had finally found a remedy. In Weeks, Day agreed with Cooley's earlier
assessment when he quoted: "[T]he maxim that 'every man's house is his castle'
was made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the
citizen.'6l Papers are a fundamental component of the Fourth Amendment and, as
such, receive the highest degree of protection - equal to that of homes. The
equating of the privacy afforded to mail to the privacy afforded to the home is due
in large part to the fact that letters are sealed. The same cannot be said for non-
encrypted electronic mail.68 For current analysis, this area of the law may be
divided into two subsections: full content interceptions of mail and mail covers.
A. Full Content Interceptions
The standard for protection of traditional mail turns on whether it is a first class
parcel or otherwise closed for inspection or sought to be sent in the most
expeditious class of mail.69 There are a number of cases that have developed the
standard by which traditional, mail may be searched and seized.IThe Court first dealt with mail searches in Ex Parte Jackson.7 In Jackson, the
Court granted the fullest protection to mail, stating that:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded
from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and
11 Id. at 394.
" See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 50.
65 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390.
" For a discussion of encryption and its impact on the law of electronic surveillance, see
Megan Connor Bertron, Home is Where Your Modem Is: An Appropriate Application of
Search and Seizure Law to Electronic Mail, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 163, 192 (1996).
69 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
(3d ed. 1996).
70 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
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weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their
own domiciles.... Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and
examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers
are subject to search in one's own household.7
Searches of letters deposited in the mail are governed by the warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. A person sending a sealed envelope via
First Class U.S. Mail has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents.72
Contrast Ex Parte Jackson with United States v. Van Leeuwen, 73 where the method
of shipment played an important role in the Court finding that an unwarranted
detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The defendant shipped two
packages via "airmail registered" mail from Washington to two separate locations.74
The postal clerk noticed that the return address was actually a vacant home and
consequently notified police." The packages were thus detained for twenty-nine
hours in order for the police to investigate the destination of the two packages.76
The investigation revealed that both addressees were currently suspected of drug
trafficking." This information formed the basis of a search warrant that then
allowed officers to open and inspect the packages, after which they were
forwarded." The Court held that such a detention did not violate the Fourth
Amendment:
No interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded by
forwarding the packages the following day rather than the day when they
were deposited. The significant Fourth Amendment interest was in the
privacy of this first-class mail; and that privacy was not disturbed or
invaded until the approval of the magistrate was obtained.79
The Court did not go so far as to say that any detention of mail is allowed;
rather, it noted that the facts of the case and the general suspicious nature of the
packages made a one-day delay reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 0 The
expectation of how fast a package should arrive at its destination thus affects the
"1 Id. at 733.
'2 United States v. Van Leeuwan, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
73 id.
74Id.
75 id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Van Leeuwan, 397 U.S. at 249.
71 Id. at 253.
80 Id.
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level of protection provided to its detention.
However, statutory protections provide that mail may not be opened except
under authority of a search warrant authorized by law."' Although it may be
detained without a warrant, the actual searching of a first class package's contents
requires judicial approval: 2
No letter of such a class" of domestic origin shall be opened except
under authority of a search warrant authorized by law, or by an officer
or employee of the Postal Service for the sole purpose of determining an
address at which the letter can be delivered, or pursuant to the
authorization of the addressee."
Thus, the same constitutional protections afforded to the searching of papers within
the home, subject to search warrant, are given to first-class mail."
B. Mail Covers
In contrast to full content searches, mail covers have long been allowed to
obtain information from the exterior of a parcel. Postal regulations first authorized
mail covers in 1893,6 but their widespread use did not come to light until the
McCarthy investigation of 1952.87 Law enforcement may nonconsensually record
any information on the outside of a sealed mail item or record the contents of an
unsealed mail matter.88 This information may be obtained for five purposes: (1)
to protect national security; (2) locate a fugitive; (3) obtain evidence of commission
or attempted commission of a crime; (4) obtain evidence of a violation or attempted
8, 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (2001).
82 39 U.S.C. § 3623 (2001).
83 This refers to the class of mail providing the most expeditious handling and
transportation. See 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (2001).
4 id.
8' United States v. Fulcher, 229 F. Supp. 456 (1964). As the options and speeds available
for mailing parcels increases, what constitutes the most expeditious means of handling mail
becomes less clear. In general, "classification of mails is based not upon merely inherent
distinctions or differences in nature and character of articles as mailable matter and cost of
their carriage, but also rests upon broad principles of public policy." 39 U.S.C. § 3623
(Interpretive Notes and Decisions) (quoting Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288,303
(1913)).
86 Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Validity, Under Fourth Amendment, of "Mail Cover", 57
A.L.R. FED. 742, 743 (1999).
87 Invasion of Privacy: Use and Abuse of Mail Covers, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
165 (1968).
83 39 C.F.IL § 233.3 (2001); see JOHN WESLEY HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (3d ed.
2000).
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violation of a postal statute; or (5) assist in the identification of forfeitable
property. 9
The chief postal inspector possesses the authority to grant such a search,
although this power may be granted to others except in instances implicating
national security.9" A mail cover order may be issued under the following
situations:
1. When a written request is received from a postal inspector that states
reason to believe a mail cover will produce evidence relating to the
violation of a postal statute.
2. When a written request is received from any law enforcement agency
in which the requesting authority specifies the reasonable grounds to
demonstrate the mail cover is necessary to [fulfill one of five objectives
discussed supra note 89 and accompanying text.]
3. When time is of the essence, the Chief Postal Inspector, or designee,
may act upon an oral request to be confirmed by the requesting authority
in writing within three calendar days.9'
The statute, therefore, grants the power to search on reasonable grounds and
without approval of an outside, detached magistrate.92 This contrasts with the
warrant requirement of full content searches and grants a lesser degree ofprotection
to the information contained on the outside of a package. The courts have found
this does not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment:
[A] mail cover does not violate plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights
where cover does not include examination of contents of mail, and
persons who sent or received mail know or ought to know that postal
employees must examine outside of mail in order to deliver it and, even
if plaintiffs harbor subjective expectation of privacy, expectation is
unreasonable in that persons who send mail to plaintiffs voluntarily
expose information on outside of envelopes to postal employees.93
Thus, the constitutionality of mail covers rests on the diminished expectation of
privacy individuals have in the information contained on the outsides of packages.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these searches in United States
19 39 C.F.R. § 233.3 (2001).
90 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(d) (2001).
91 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(e) (2001).
92 Id.
93 Feld, supra note 86, at 20 (quoting Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343 (1983)).
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v. Jacobsen." In Jacobsen, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not
require the DEA to obtain a search warrant before testing a substance leaking from
a package." It reasoned that "it is constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement
officials to seize 'effects' that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy
without a warrant based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband." '96
IV. LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Courts approach the protection of electronic communications from illegal
search and seizure differently than of traditional correspondence. Although the
courts have not accorded electronic speech the same level of deference as traditional
speech, it is within the context of wiretapping that the Supreme Court articulated
that the right to privacy belongs to people and not places.9" In addition, searches of
electronic communications are governed by statutory requirements.98
A. Full Content Interceptions - Constitutional Requirements
Prior to the Olmstead v. United States decision in 1928, the Court built privacy
upon a conception of physical space." As new technologies developed, the Court
began to consider invasions of another sort. Wiretapping, eavesdropping, and other
electronic monitoring devices became increasingly common in police investigations
during the early 1900s. As a consequence, the right of privacy had to be
reconsidered in light of searches without a trespass and seizures without physical
evidence."° The Court began to address the privacy of communications in
Olmstead.'0
Olmstead was convicted in the district court for the Western District of
Washington for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act for unlawfully
possessing, transporting, and importing intoxicating liquors and maintaining
nuisances, and selling intoxicating liquors. 0 2 The information that led to the
discovery of the conspiracy and its nature and extent was obtained through
intercepting messages on the telephones of the conspirators by federal prohibition
9 466 U.S. 109 (1983).
95 Id.
9 Id. at 112-22. See also United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Costell, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1958); Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1957).
97 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
98 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2001).
9 See Boyd v. United States, 16 U.S. 616 (1886).
100 Id.
101 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
102 Id.
2002]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
officers."3 Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the
residences of four of the conspirators as well as those leading from the main
office.° 4 The insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the
defendants;'05 the office taps were made in the basement of a large office building,
and'o6 the home taps were made in the streets near the house.'0 7
The Court utilized the property-based claims that underlie the Boyddecision.08
The Court construed privacy protection as resting on the maxim of"a man's home
is his castle":
Legitimate claims to the privacy of individuals' engagements arose with
regard to and were justifiable in terms of the locus of the individuals'
engagements as defined by proprietary interests. Privacy claims were
strongest in so-called "constitutionally protected areas", particularly in
one's house, and were enforced by the express requirements of the
Fourth Amendment as well as the judicially constructed mere evidence
and exclusionary rules.0 9
In the case of Olmstead, there were no constitutionally protected areas." 0 The
Court strictly construed the Fourth Amendment to apply only to material things -
the person, the house, his papers, or his effects.I I I However, this protection did not
apply to private communications."' Justice Taft wrote:
The United States takes no such care of telegraph or telephone messages
as of mailed sealed letters. The Amendment does not forbid what was
done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants. By the
invention of the telephone 50 years ago, and its application for the
purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at a far
distant place. The language of the Amendment cannot be extended and
expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from
the defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 id.
106 Id.
17 Olnistead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
"08 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-38 (1886).
'09 O'BRIEN, supra note 50, at 50.
"o Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
"I Id.
112 Id.
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house or office, any more than are the highways along with they are
stretched.1'3
To expand the Fourth Amendment's application to communications, as
Olmstead argued, would unduly enlarge the Amendment." 4 It would apply search
and seizure protection to the mere act of hearing or seeing the conversation of
another." 5 In the Court's view, it would be an unusual understanding to apply to
the Fourth Amendment. 6 The majority held that a person who utilizes telephone
equipment intends for his/her voice to be projected out into the world, therefore
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy."7
I Justice Brandeis, in a most prophetic dissent, rejected the literal, property-based
conception of privacy that the majority attributed to Boyd."' He argued that the
narrow language of the Amendment had been construed in a broader sense." 9 He
wrote: "[T]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness.... They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men."' 20
Because people had this broad-based individual privacy, wiretapping surely
violated it.' 2' Looking to Exparte Jackson,22 Brandeis wrote: "[T]he evil incident
to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in
tampering with the mails."'12 Furthermore, he wrote:
"[T]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes." Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention
have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet. 24
Brandeis's foresight would prove impeccable. However, the Court would not
"1 Id. at 464-65.
Id. at464.
115 Id.
116 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
117 Id.
" Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"1 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 478. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
121 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
122 Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
'z Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475.
124 Id. at 473. (citations omitted).
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heed his words until 1967.125 Until the Court decided Katz v. United States, 126 they
stuck primarily with the Boyd-Olmstead construction of the Fourth Amendment-
basing the right to privacy upon a property interest.127
Following Olmstead, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of
1934. Section 605 of the Act provides that no person who, as an employee, has to
do with the sending or receiving of any interstate communication by wire shall
divulge or publish it or its substance to anyone other than the addressee or his
authorized representative or to authorized fellow employees, save:
[I]n response to a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction
or on demand of other lawful authority. No person not being authorized
by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person. 21
The Court utilized this Act to largely avoid the issue of electronic surveillance
as a Fourth Amendment privacy issue. Instead, they viewed issues of wiretapping
as dealing with interpreting and applying Section 605.129 In Nardone v. United
States, the Court utilized this tactic, finding that Section 605 precluded federal
officers from wrongfully obtaining evidence through intercepted telephone
messages. 30
In Goldman v. United States, the Court returned to the Olmstead theory, ruling
that conversations overheard with a dectaphone were admissible.' 3 ' A dectaphone
is a listening apparatus that could be placed up against a wall to overhear
conversations in the next room.'32 They found that use of the device did not
constitute an illegal trespass or unlawful entry, and therefore did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.' 33 In contrast, however, they found that a dictaphone, a device
requiring placement within the walls, was a violation because it required entrance
into the defendant's home for installation.' 34
125 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
126 Id.
127 See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Perlman v. United States,
247 U.S. 7 (1918) (relying on trespass theory to uphold searches).
128 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2001).
129 O'BRIEN, supra note 50, at 54.
130 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
'3' Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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The Court would continue to employ this logic in Silverman v. United States.'"I
In Silverman, officers overheard conversations concerning gambling offenses by
means of an electronic listening device that had been pushed through the party wall
of an adjoining house until it touched the heating ducts in the house occupied by
Silverman.'36 The Court held that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means
of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises, therefore violating their
rights under the Fourth Amendment.' 7 The Court stated: "[E]avesdropping
accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even
those decision in which a closely divided Court has held that eavesdropping
accomplished by other electronic means did not amount to an invasion of Fourth
Amendment rights."'3
They refused, however, to address the larger Fourth Amendment question
presented by the case. The Court stated: "[T]he facts of the present case, however,
do not require us to consider the large questions which have been argued. We need
not here contemplate the Fourth Amendment implications of these and other
frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit
upon human society."' 39 This reexamination would take place six years later in
Katz v. United States. 40
Katz was convicted in the district court for the Southern District of California
for transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and
Boston.'4 ' Evidence was admitted of telephone conversations overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside
of the public telephone booth from which Katz had placed his calls.'42 The Court
directly overturned Olmstead, stating:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have
been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine
there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The
Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
on while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the
electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to
'3 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
136 Id.
B7 Id.
138 Id. at 509-10.
139 Id. at 509.
140 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
141 id.
142 Id.
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penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance. 43
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and that
individuals can make ideas and feelings very public from inside their homes as well
as expect certain levels of privacy out in the world.'" This is consistent with the
Court's finding that individuals enjoy a certain amount of personal privacy when
in hotels, others' apartments, or taxicabs, and so do their conversations."" The
Fourth Amendment extends beyond these constitutionally protected areas to include
oral statements, and therefore the physical intrusion standard established by
Olmstead was rejected.
Under what conditions, then, could the government employ electronic
surveillance? In Katz, the Court generally referred to a "strong probability" of
wrongdoing that must be present and stated the surveillance be limited in scope and
in duration to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner's
unlawful telephone communications. " More specifically, the Court stated, "under
sufficiently 'precise and discriminate circumstances,' a federal court may empower
government agents to employ a concealed electronic device for the narrow and
particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the.., allegations of a detailed
factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense."' 47
The Court clearly delineated the constitutional requirements underlying Fourth
Amendment surveillance in Bergerv. New York.'" The case, decided a few months
before Katz, struck down a New York Statute permitting eavesdropping. 49 They
found the language of Section 813-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure
was "too broad in its sweep resulting in a trespassory intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area and is, therefore, violative of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments."'5 ° The Court detailed three standards for evaluating a
justifiable "eavesdropping" search and seizure.''
First, the Fourth Amendment requires that a neutral and detached authority be
interposed between the police and the public.'52 Second, a warrant may only be
issued upon probable cause, meaning the facts and circumstances within the
affiant's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an
143 Id. at 353.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., supra note 51.
146 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967).
47 Id. at 355. (citations omitted).
14' Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 44.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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offense has been or is being committed.' Finally, the Fourth Amendment requires
"particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."'" The Court in Berger held: "[T]he need for particularity and evidence
of reliability in the showing required when judicial authorization of a search is
sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping. By its very nature
eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope.""'
Since Katz, the technologies of eavesdropping have grown, as has the
importance of information being transmitted. It is no wonder that there have been
a number of attempts to protect legislatively individual privacy as well as law
enforcement surveillance.
B. Full Content Interceptions - Statutory Requirements
Title 111, as amended by the ECPA, serves as the primary statute protecting
electronic communications. After the Court determined that electronic surveillance
falls within the purview of the Fourth Amendment,' 56 Congress codified the
constitutional requirements in Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.' In 1986, Congress further amended the Act to protect
electronic communications, and thus re-titled it the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986.1" Most recently, Congress further amended the statute
ostensibly to provide law enforcement easier access to digital communications
technology by enacting the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA). 159
"' Id. See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Husty v. United States,
282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
1' Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961).
... Id. at 56.
'- See Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
'57 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001).
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2001).
159 18 U.S.C. § 2522 (2001) (enforcing CALEA, 47 U.S.C. § 1001, by expanding access
to all forms of surveillance). CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to install wiretap
facilities in all relay stations for police access. The law attempts to address the supposed
difficulty of tracing cellular and some digital telephone conversations. It does not however,
apply to computer information systems such as the Internet, Prodigy, or AOL. 47 U.S.C. §
1001.
CALEA instituted extensive regulations providing police agencies with facilitated
wiretap capabilities. THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 26, at 85-86. The statute
purportedly balanced three key policies: (1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for
law enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy
in the face of increasingly power and personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid
impeding the development of new communications services and technologies. Id.
The statute's specific capability requirements are: (1) expeditiously isolate the content
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ECPA protects wire, 60 oral, '6' and electronic 162 communications from illegal
interceptions. In order for law enforcement to conduct an interception, numerous
requirements must be met. First, a high level official must authorize application for
a wiretap. 163 Second, wiretaps are restricted to investigation of felonies.'" Third,
'an Article I judge must grant the order.'6s Fourth, probable cause must be
demonstrated, and it must be shown that normal investigative procedures are
of a targeted communication within its service area; (2) isolate call identifying information
about the origin and destination of a targeted communication; (3) enable the government to
access isolated communications at a point away from the carrier's premises and on facilities
procured by the government; and (4) do so unobtrusively and in such a way that protects the
privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted. 47 U.S.C. § 1001.
CALEA contains seven components designed to enhance personal privacy. THE
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 26, at 80-82. First, it requires a court order rather
than a subpoena to obtain e-mail address and other transactional data from electronic
communications service providers. Id. Secondly, it expressly provides that the authority for
pen registers and trap and trace devices cannot be used to obtain tracking or location
information. Id. Third, it allows any person to petition the FCC for review of standards
implementing wiretap capability requirements. Id. Fourth, it does not require mobile service
providers to reconfigure their networks to deliver the content of communications occurring
outside a carrier's service area. Id. CALEA also extends privacy protections of the ECPA
to cordless phones and requires intervention of common carriers' personnel for switch-based
interceptions, meaning law enforcement may not activate interceptions remotely or without
the knowledge of a telecommunications carrier. Finally, it does not forbid the use of
encryption technology. Id.
160 18 U.S.C. § 25 10(1) defines wire communication as:
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception ... furnished
or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for
the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications
affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic
storage of such communication ....
Id.
161 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) defines oral communication as: "[A]ny oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include
any electronic communication."
162 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) defines electronic communication as: "[A]ny transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or
in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo optical system that affects
interstate commerce .... "
163 18 U.S.C § 2516(1) (2001).
'6 Id. at § 2516(3).
165 Id. at § 2518(3).
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insufficient.' Fifth, the order must specifically contain:
1. the identity of the interceptee; 2. the nature and location of the
communications facilities to which the authority to intercept is granted;
3. a particular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;
4. the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications,
and of the person authorizing the application; and 5. the period of time
during which such interception is authorized. 67
Sixth, the interception must be minimized to achieve the objective." Seventh, after
termination of the intercept the judge must notify those parties whose
communications were intercepted. 9
These protections seem to guarantee, if not expand, the constitutional
requirements for interception of communications. However, the ECPA provides
differing treatment for oral/wire communications and electronic communications
such as e-mail. There are three basic differences in the ECPA's treatment of
electronic communications.7 0 First, it may be intercepted for any felony rather than
an enumerate list that limits oral and wire intercepts.' Second, an electronic
intercept does not need a court order, but may be authorized by an Attorney
General.' Finally, the exclusionary provision of the statute does not apply to
electronic communications.' Thus, any information obtained by illegally
intercepting electronic communications may still be utilized in prosecuting the
individual. This is in stark contrast to the exclusionary protections provided
traditional papers and essentially strips a right of any remedy.
C. Partial Content Interceptions - Trap & Trace and Pen Register Devices
Pen register and trap and trace devices provide law enforcement with numbers
dialed from or to the line to which it is attached.'1 4 For example, law enforcement
would attach a pen register to the phone of a suspect in order to obtain a list of
numbers called. In contrast, a trap and trace device might be used on a victim's line
'6 Id. at § 2518(3).
167 Motta, supra note 8, at 663.
16 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2001).
169 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (2001).
170 See Robert S. Steere, Keeping 'Private E-Mail' Private: A Proposal to Modify the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 33 VAL U. L. REv. 231, 256 (1998).
1'7 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
" United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 (1974).
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to determine a call's origin number.' Statutory criminal procedure allows a
government attorney to apply for approval to utilize these techniques in an ongoing
investigation. 76 An application must be made to a court of competent jurisdiction
and include both the identity of the investigative officer making the application and
a certification that the information to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation.'" The statute contains no probable cause requirement for this type
of search, and the Court has found that such investigations do not constitute a
search requiring a Warrant under the Fourth Amendment. 17
Smith involved a robbery victim receiving threatening phone calls from an
individual identifying himself as the perpetrator.' Police, without obtaining a
search warrant or court order, installed a pen register at the telephone company's
main switching station to monitor phone numbers dialed by a suspect in the case.' 80
In determining whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated, the Court
asked whether the person invoking the protection could claim a justifiable,
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that had been invaded by
government. '' This inquiry involves two questions: (1) whether the individual has
exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this
subjective expectation is one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'
The Court found no expectation of privacy in the numbers called.
Distinguishing the case from Katz, they pointed to the fact that pen registers do not
acquire any contents of the communications." Instead, the pen register only
detects the means of establishing communication - the tones that connect one
phone with another; as such, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
dialing information because people understand that these tones must be transmitted
to another in order for the technology to work.'8 Information voluntarily turned
over to third parties has consistently been held to contain no legitimate expectation
' 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) defines pen register as: "[A] device which records or decodes
electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on
the telephone line to which such device is attached. . . ."; Id. Section 3127(4) defines a trap
and trace device as: "[A] device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating number of an instrument or device from which a wire or
electronic communication was transmitted .... "
176 Id. at § 3122(a).
17' Id. at § 3122(b).
171 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
179 Id at 73 7.
180 Id. at 735.
"'i Id. at 739 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
182 id.
183 Id.
114 Id. at741.
185 Id.
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of privacy.'86
The dissent argued that the numbers dialed are akin to the content protected
under Katz. The Court reasoned that a person making calls from his home certainly
would want to keep who they were calling private.'87
Most private telephone subscribers may have their own numbers listed
in a publicly distributed directory, but I doubt there are any who would
be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long
distance numbers they have called... [to do so would] reveal the most
intimate details of a person's life.'88
The dissenters in Katz also argued that allowing warrantless interceptions of pen
registers ignores the vital role that telephone communications play in everyday
life.'8 9 "To hold otherwise ignores the vital role telephonic communication plays
in our personal and professional relationships."'19
In addition to finding that pen registers and trap and trace devices do not fall
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Court also held that protections
provided to other interceptions under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 do not apply.'9' The Court
in New York Telephone distinguished Title III as not governing the authorization of
the use of pen registers because they do not acquire the contents of
communications:' 92
[A] law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of
a pen register whether a communication existed. These devices do not
hear sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers that have been
dialed - a means of establishing communication. Neither the purport
of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call,
their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by
pen registers.'"
Because of the limited scope of the intercept, it does not qualify for the highest level
of Fourth Amendment protection. Rather, the restrictions are quite limited, subject
16 Id. at 743-44. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 442 (1976); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
117 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I'l Id. at 748.
89 Id. at 75 1. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'90 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'm' United States v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
192 Id. at 166.
193 Id. at 167.
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only to an ongoing investigation requirement."
V. INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC MAIL
As a burgeoning means of communications, citizens continue to increase their
reliance upon electronic mail usage. E-mail has widely replaced the telephone and
traditional mail in business, educational, and personal settings. The Florida
Supreme Court stated: "[E]-mail transmissions are quickly becoming a substitute
for telephonic and printed communications, as well as a substitute for direct oral
communications."' 95 Under what level of protection the search and seizure of
electronic mail falls is a question the courts have not answered:
Because email communications take the place of both oral and written
communications, can be saved electronically (and therefore potentially
accessed by systems operators), printed in hard copy, and easily re-
transmitted by recipients, the privacy rights of senders and recipients of
e-mail (at least in unencrypted form) are still being defined by courts. 96
The two possible treatments of e-mail are as electronic surveillance or
traditional correspondence. Courts have chosen the former and protect electronic
mail under the ECPA.'9 The ECPA requires either a warrant or subpoena for
disclosure of the contents of electronic communications.'" "The law applies most
of the same prohibitions and requirements to the interception of electronic
communications as it does to telephone (wire) communications."'" The Act
distinguishes between the interception of messages as they are sent and the
searching of electronic storage."0 The Department of Justice has developed
guidelines for the searching and seizing of computers that are distinguishable from
the interception of electronic communications.2"'
'" See also William A. Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 108 (1970);
Victor S. Elgort, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law
Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1028 (1975); Clifford S. Fishman, Pen Registers
and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of Congressional Intent, 29 CATH.
U. L. REV. 557 (1980).
15 Ian C. Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law: A Primer, in Fourth Annual Internet
Law Institute (Ian C. Ballon et al. eds., 2000) (citing In Re: Amendments to Rule of Judicial
Administration, 651 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1995)).
96 Id. at 128. (emphasis added).
191 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2001).
198 Id.
'" Bertron, supra note 68, at 176.
200 Id. at 177-78.
201 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR SEARCHING AND SEIZING
COMPUTERS (July 1994) (supplemented in 1997 & 1999), available at http://usdoj.gov/
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The Fifth Circuit has held that the term "intercept" means the acquisition of an
electronic communication that is "contemporaneous with the transmission of those
communications."20 2 Steve Jackson Games ran a commercial bulletin board service
on which players of their games could exchange information.2 3 The Secret Service
suspected them of cyber-terrorism and hacking based upon one of the commercial
role-playing games it marketed: °4
In executing a search warrant authorizing seizure of"computer hardware
... and computer software," the U.S. Secret Service searched, read, and
deleted 162 items of unread, private e-mail stored on the BBS. Because
the Secret Service obtained neither a court order to intercept, nor a
warrant to search the stored communications, the Fifth Circuit upheld
the district court's conclusion that ECPA had been violated and likewise
affirmed a statutory damages award.20 5
The ECPA requires that if an electronic communication service has held the
contents of an electronic communication in storage for 180 days or less, it may
disclose that communication to the government only pursuant to a federal or state
warrant. 2" The Eleventh Circuit held in Lopez v. First Union National Bank of
Florida that a verbal instruction by law enforcement was insufficient for disclosure
of electronic wire-transfer records. 27 However, it distinguished between documents
in storage and those in transmission. Lopez's claim that the ECPA was violated
when the Bank released communications in storage was dismissed:2°
Alleging that First Union disclosed a communication held in "electronic
storage," which violates § 2702(a)(1), is not equivalent to alleging that
First Union disclosed a communication in "transmission," which would
violate § 2711 (3)(a). Because the complaint does not allege that First
Union disclosed communications while in transmission, it fails to state
criminal/cybercrime/searchdocs/toc.htm.
202 Bertron, sipra note 68, at 178 (quoting Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret
Service, 36 F.3d 457,459-60 (1994)).
203 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (1994).
204 Id.
205 Bertron, supra note 68, at 178.
206 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2001).
207 Lopez v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fl., 129 F.3d 1186 (1 th Cir. 1997). Pursuant to
a seizure warrant, the bank provided "law enforcement authorities access to contents of the
electronic funds transfers sent to Lopez that were being held in electronic storage." Id. at
1188.
20 Id. at 1189.
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a claim under § 2711 (3)(a).2"
This distinction between storage and transmitted communications only adds to
the confusion of which standard to apply to e-mail. Letters are treated the same
whether they are being transported by the United States Postal Service or sitting
stored within someone's personal desk. The courts, much like Congress, are
unclear as to where this new medium should fall. Currently, the ECPA classifies
e-mail as electronic communications subject to the same protections as telephone
conversations. However, e-mail is not a phone conversation and the Carnivore
system does more than a traditional pen register or trap and trace. The question
then becomes whether such an interception should be subject to constitutional or
statutory protections, and if it can successfully pass either.
VI. FULL CONTENT INTERCEPTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
When law enforcement seeks to intercept the communications between two
parties, it is limited by constitutional and statutory requirements. These procedures
exemplify the level of privacy afforded to a particular means of communications
and protect them from governmental intrusion. How much protection, however,
depends upon the means of the communication rather than the substance.
The reason for this distinction rests historically in the technology. In general,
written letters and papers constitute the original form of communication between
people. Paper, as used here, includes one's diary, love letters, bills, and credit card
statements. From the most mundane daily receipt to the most confidential personal
record, paper plays a fundamental role in our lives and has done so since the
invention of papyrus.
In contrast, telephone, faxes, the Internet, and e-mail are all relatively new
phenomena. Only in the last century have individuals been able to transmit their
voice (and consequently, their ideas) across space. Families once divided by
geography can carry on close relationships. Friends converse even though living
on separate continents. Business operates twenty-four hours a day due to the
globalization of the economy, and information trades as a commodity. Electronic
communications quicken the exchange of ideas, but do not fundamentally alter its
content. Illogically, the courts do not agree. Traditional communication receives
differing treatment under the law than new technologies. Consequently, burgeoning
media such as electronic mail lacks fundamental privacy.
A. Traditional Mail
Philosophically and legally, traditional letters receive the highest level of
209 Id. at 1190.
[Vol. 10:3
BITS AND BYTES
protection from unwarranted searches and seizures. Explicit in the Constitution,
personal papers are equivalent to an individual's home." ° Intrinsically, documents
that are drafted and mailed constitute the private thoughts of a citizen, and those
thoughts are protected not only under the Fourth Amendment, but also the First and
Fifth Amendments.21'
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued in their seminal essay on the right
to privacy that the "principle which protects personal writings and any other
production of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy.... ,212 Mental
works implicitly represent the belief that the creator has control over their
dissemination. Protection from public disclosure of private facts is an essential
element of the right to privacy."3 Both explicitly and implicitly, the law protects
papers and thus letters from invasion. Individuals have always expected, and
continue to expect, that their personal ideas will not be made known to others
without their consent or court intervention.
Because of this perception, the mail receives the highest level of protection of
all forms of communications. A search of the mail requires a valid warrant. In
order to obtain such a warrant, law enforcement must show by oath or affirmation
probable cause such that exists when "'the facts and circumstances within... [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that' an offense has been committed."'2 " Furthermore, the warrant must state with
specificity the place to be searched and things to be seized, and must be signed by
a detached and neutral magistrate."'
These stringent procedural requirements protect letters from overzealous and
arbitrary searches. The probable cause standard requires more than a mere
suspicion of wrongdoing, thus protecting citizens from random searches.
Furthermore, requiring a judicial officer to issue the warrant affords an external
check on law enforcement activities. A detached third party must review the
information provided by investigators and determine whether it is sufficient to
invade an individual's privacy.
In addition to these procedures, the most important component of the
jurisprudence protecting full content searches of mail is the exclusionary rule. The
right to have one's personal affects protected would be meaningless without some
2-0 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
211 U.S. CONST. amends. I, V (protecting freedom of speech and right against self
incrimination respectively).
212 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 213
(1890).
213 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
214 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
215 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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remedy. When officers violate the search warrant requirements set forth above the
evidence wrongfully obtained is excluded from admission into evidence.1 6 This
helps to ensure against wrongful activity by police. If there were no consequences
for obtaining evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, there would be no
incentive to act within the bounds of the Constitution. Thus, mail receives a
multitude of constitutional protections equal to those of homes. Contrast this with
the lower levels of protection granted electronic communications.
B. Electronic Communications
Unlike papers, electronic communications have not enjoyed implicit or explicit
protections against unwarranted searches and seizures. To the contrary, the courts
originally found no privacy whatsoever in conversations transmitted over telephone
lines." 7 Privacy depended on some physicality which mere conversations lacked.
The trespass doctrine relied upon the intrusion of a person's home, a
constitutionally protected area.18 Conversations were protected not on the grounds
that they were inherently private, but on where they were intercepted. 219
The Constitution makes no explicit mention of protecting conversations andthe
Supreme Court for many years refused to expand the Fourth Amendment to do so. 220
The right to privacy that communications now enjoy has developed over time, rather
than being inherent in peoples' conceptions of them. This contrasts starkly with the
fundamental belief that privacy extends to a person's papers.
The philosophical underpinning of communications surveillance rests upon
propertied interests, and the Court has struggled with its application to oral and wire
communications. This difficulty only multiplies when the means of
communications are electronic. Cyberspace consists of no tangible property;
instead, it is an amalgam of thoughts, conversations, records, and intellectual
property. This lack of tangibility delineates it even further from the legal reasoning
extending privacy protection to telephone conversations. Furthermore,
communication technology continues to change forcing the courts to play a losing
game of catch-up.
Although oral and wire communications now receive full constitutional and
statutory protections, 22 electronic communications have not been afforded this
same treatment. E-mail may be intercepted pursuant to a warrant issued not by a
216 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
217 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
218 Boyd v. United States, 16 U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
219 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
220 Id. at 465.
221 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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court order, but rather by the authorization of an attorney general."22 In addition, the
ECPA explicitly does not apply the exclusionary rule to illegal interceptions of e-
mail.223
This differential treatment subjugates e-mail to a lesser form of communication.
It eliminates the external check and remedy afforded to traditional papers. It makes
little sense to protect papers based on format. For example, suppose an individual
writes a personal letter to their spouse or doctor about something of great
importance. In one case, that person places the letter in an envelope, seals it, and
sends it along its way via post or merely leaves it on her desk. The information
contained in that piece of paper would receive the highest form of protection
afforded under the Fourth Amendment.
In the other instance, the individual scans the document into a computer (or,
more likely, has drafted it on one) and e-mails it to the same addressees to whom
the hard copy is going. The manner in which she chose to send the document
greatly compromises the protection it will be granted. Law enforcement may more
easily intercept the electronic copy under statutory provisions of Title 111. 224 Also,
in the event that the information has been obtained in violation of these
requirements, there is no recourse, other than a civil action, to remedy the wrong.2 5
The differential treatment rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the
technology. The purpose and substance of online communications is identical to
that of traditional paper. The distinction rests upon the medium alone and should
be eradicated. As individuals increase their reliance on electronic communications
for all functions of daily life, they will concomitantly increase their expectations of
privacy in these mediae. It is imperative that the law value substance over form and
recognize a right to privacy inherent in all forms of communication.
VII. PARTIAL CONTENT INTERCEPTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Both pen registers and mail covers effectively achieve the same goal: they
allow law enforcement to gain the information on the outside of a communication
to determine its origin and destination. Pen registers and trap and trace electronic
listening devices provide information about the digital tones that constitute a phone
number. Mail covers include the address and postmark information on the outside
of standard domestic correspondence. Neither provides any specific information
222 See Steere, supra note 170, at 252.
223 id.
,24 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2001).
22 Id.
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about the contents of a package other than that which is readily ascertainable. 2
These types of general address searches receive less Fourth Amendment
protection than full content searches of electronic communications. This distinction
again rests on the reasonable expectation of privacy test articulated in Olmstead.22
Because it is assumed that others must read the information for transmission, the
sender must have a diminished expectation of privacy. After all, the person chooses
who and how to send the message.
A. Mail Covers
Law enforcement may conduct a mail cover search under reasonable suspicion
for four specific purposes.228 The search does not require independent authority;
rather, only the approval of a postal inspector is necessary.2 9 Therefore, subject to
only limited exceptions, law enforcement may obtain all of the mailing information
of an individual. This could include the size, weight, and destination of all
packages or letters being sent. In addition, all shipments incoming may be observed
and inventoried.
Again, the general reasoning behind this is that people have no expectation of
privacy in addressing information. However, the Court ignores the expectation of
privacy people have in what comes in and out of their home. When a citizen puts
a parcel in the hands of the United States Postal Service, they expect that a mail
clerk will necessarily read the outside of the package. It is unlikely, however, that
they anticipate a police officer would observe and record that same information.
The same could be said of telephone calls coming in and out of an individual's
home.
B. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices
Like mail covers, pen registers are afforded few constitutional protections. Law
enforcement may conduct such a search under authorization of any court after
showing its relevancy to an ongoing investigation." This diminished standard
allows for interception of all numbers dialed without any showing of probable
cause. In contrast, such a tap might not even be put on a suspect's phone, but rather
on a friend's or family member's phone regularly used by the target of the
226 Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1983) (holding that the search of a
package which was visibly leaking cocaine did not constitute a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment).
227 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,468 (1928).
22 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(e)(2) (2001).
-1 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(d) (2001).
230 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122-3123 (2001).
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investigation. This enables law enforcement to ascertain the full list of people
called from a certain telephone number.
The Court reasoned that individuals have no privacy expectation in such
information."' If this were the case, would the justices not mind having a list of all
the numbers that they dialed within the past month published in the Washington
Post, or better yet placed into an FBI file? Most people probably do expect the
phone number and identities of those they call to remain private. That type of
information reveals more than just a series of numbers. It describes habits,
propensities, relationships, and quirks. Numbers of mistresses, shops, and 1-900
services may reveal more about an individual than other investigative techniques
subject to full Fourth Amendment protections.
These types of address interceptions receive less protection because of
diminished privacy expectations. They should, however, receive the full Fourth
Amendment protection afforded to content interceptions. The question then
becomes where does an e-mail interception like those conducted under Carnivore
fall? Should it receive full content protection, or is it more analogous to a partial
interception? Finally, what procedures currently govern the use of Carnivore, and
do they rise to the appropriate standard?
VIII. CARNIVORE: A HYBRID
Utilizing Carnivore, law enforcement may intercept the routing information
contained in an electronic mail communication. This information, consisting of
binary data, reveals the e-mail address of the sender and receiver, date, time, and the
subject line. The last of these may consist of as much or as little information as the
sender wants. Sometimes it is left completely blank, but others may contain
specific information including attachment file names.
As such, the information contained in e-mail addresses does not easily fall into
either category of analysis: traditional or oral. No case law yet exists on the
searches of e-mail addresses. By way of analogy, the courts will surely treat it as
a pen register and protect it accordingly. E-mail jurisprudence has applied the law
of oral communications, and both are protected under Title I. Therefore, the
obtaining of binary code constituting address information would be comparable to
the interception of digital dial tones that make up a telephone number.
The distinction, however, is that Carnivore does more than that. Carnivore can
and does reveal the subject matter line of an e-mail. The Court pointed directly to
the fact that no information was intercepted using a pen register in New York
Telephone.23 ' It stated: "[N]either the purport of any communication between the
caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even
231 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
232 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977).
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completed is disclosed by pen registers.,2 33 That is not the case with e-mail
interceptions.
The subject matter line does reveal the purport of the communication. In fact,
it states explicitly the purpose of the letter. In contrast, a phone call may contain
no content at all if it is not completed. Calls might be wrong numbers or the desired
person may not be home. An e-mail address contains who is doing the writing and
the name of the recipients. The entirety of the communication may be contained
within the single message - a stark contrast to a number dialed.
E-mail has a self-contained nature. Within it are all the contents that it will ever
have, and Carnivore possesses the capability to intercept it.234 Because of this,
Carnivore should be subject to full content protections rather than the standard of
either a mail cover or pen register. In this instance, the potential reach of law
enforcement is far too great. It has both the capability and freedom to intercept
large amounts of information based on little more than relevancy. This power must
be weighed against the privacy rights inherent in communication of documents.
Thus, the full warrant requirement and exclusionary rule must be applied to any
searches conducted with the Carnivore program.
IX. CARNIVORE: THE CURRENT STANDARDS AND THEIR ADEQUACY
The FBI has established standards governing the use of Carnivore, and they
follow those established by the ECPA. First, it must demonstrate probable cause
to a judicial authority.23 Second, it must explain why traditional enforcement
methods are insufficient.236 Finally, the Bureau looks at the size of the ongoing
investigations and the resources spent on conducting electronic surveillance.
23 7
These standards rise to the level of those established under traditional
constitutional and statutory protections. They do not, however, extend the
exclusionary rule to improper interceptions. This is something that remains for the
Court to decide. Hopefully, it will recognize the lack of distinction between an
electronic messages and physical paper and afford the former the same level of
protection as the latter.
X. CONCLUSION
The law governing the search and seizure of communications is vast and
complex. This is due in large part because courts insist on relying on outdated
233 id.
234 See Poulsen, supra note 4.
235 Motta, supra note 8 at 665.
236 Id.
237 Id.
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definitions of communications. When the Fourth Amendment sought to protect
"houses, papers, and effects," 238 it meant that protection to be present regardless of
the form those items take. Papers are the private communications of individuals
whether they are written on parchment, stationery or in the bits of data that
constitute this document.
The Carnivore initiative represents another attempt by law enforcement to
control crime in cyberspace. It appears that the FBI understands the concerns of
privacy advocates and has implemented a procedure that mirrors the protections
currently provided under the law. Unfortunately, that law does not recognize that
as science advances, new communications technologies will continue to replace the
old while long-understood expectations of privacy will spill into the brave new
world.
Sandy D. Hellums
238 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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